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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
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ROBERT LEROY DALEY JR.,
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NO. 46635-2018
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-18-29769

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Robert Daley pled guilty to two counts of sexual
exploitation of a child. He received a unified sentence of twenty years, with four years fixed.
Mr. Daley contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating factors that exist in
his case.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Daley was charged by Information with six counts of sexual exploitation of a child,
after law enforcement was notified that digital images depicting child pornography were
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uploaded onto the Microsoft cloud in an account identified as belonging to Mr. Daley.
(R., pp.15-17; Presentencing Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 pp.216-217; Tr., p.26,
Ls.11-18.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Daley pled guilty to two count of sexual exploitation
and the remaining counts were dismissed. (R., pp.21-28; Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.8, L.5, p.19, L.25 –
p.21, L.2.) Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a
sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, on Count I and ten years indeterminate on Count II,
with the sentence on Count II consecutive to Count I. (R., pp.22-23; Tr., p.7, Ls.5-17.) The
defense was free to argue for a lesser sentence. (R., pp.22-23; Tr., p.7, L.17.)
At sentencing, the prosecutor recommended a unified sentence of twenty years, with a
fixed term of four years. (Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.4.) Mr. Daley’s counsel asked the district
court to retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.38, Ls.19-21.) The district court imposed a sentence of ten
years, with four years fixed on Count I, and ten indeterminate years on Count II. (Tr., p.41, Ls.412.) The sentences were consecutive, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with
four years fixed. (Tr., p.41, Ls.4-12; R., pp.38-41.) Mr. Daley filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
(R., pp.44-46.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of twenty years,
with four years fixed, upon Mr. Daley following his plea of guilty to two counts of possessing
sexually exploitative materials?

1

Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Twenty
Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Daley Following His Plea Of Guilty To Two Counts
Of Possessing Sexually Exploitative Materials
Mr. Daley asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of twenty years,
with four years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
In reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry
regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Daley does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Daley must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

Id.

The

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
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In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Daley’s sentence was excessive.
At age 56, Mr. Daley has no prior convictions for conduct of a sexual nature. (PSI, pp.216-219.)
In fact, Mr. Daley had only been convicted of a misdemeanor traffic violation in 1987. (PSI,
pp.175, 218-219.) The Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that the first offender should be
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670,
673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91
(1982).
Another important matter that should have received the attention of the district court is
that Mr. Daley has the support of his family. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595
(1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his
rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988)
(reducing sentence of first-time offender who had a family depending upon him for support and
who accepted responsibility for the offense at issue), overruled on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295
(1990). Mr. Daley maintains a good relationship with his family. (PSI, pp.177-178, 220-221.)
He has two adult daughters with whom he speaks on the telephone several times each week.
(PSI, pp.177, 220-221.)
Mr. Daley was in the Army for nine years. (PSI, p.222.) Mr. Daley served in Operation
Desert Storm and was honorably discharged. (PSI, pp.176, 222.) In State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,
90 (1982), the court found the defendant’s honorable discharge from the military to be a factor in
mitigation of sentence.
Mr. Daley suffers from PTSD due to his combat experiences. (PSI, pp.176, 189.) The
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to
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consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581
(1999).
Idaho recognizes that good employment history should be considered a mitigating factor.
See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).
Mr. Daley has an extensive employment history, working in several fields. (PSI, pp.179-180,
217.) He has worked in the construction industry for thirty years, and he had been employed as a
safety engineer for approximately two years when he was arrested for this offense. (PSI, pp.178179, 217, 222.)
Further, Mr. Daley expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his acts. (Tr., p.7,
L.5 – p.8, L.5, p.19, L.25 – p.21, L.2; p.39, Ls.7-11; PSI, pp.173, 217-218, 225.) Mr. Daley
believes he can benefit from sexual offender treatment, telling the psychosexual evaluator, “I
believe that with the proper program that I can and will change my thought process.” (PSI,
p.183.) In fact, Mr. Daley exhibited potential positive indicators for success in treatment. (PSI,
p.187.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse for
his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982);
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Daley accepted full responsibility for
his acts and admitted that the conduct was his fault. (PSI, pp.21, 50.)
The issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has been
addressed in several cases. For example, in State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the
Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed
“remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and
other positive attributes of his character.” Id. at 209.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant’s term of imprisonment because
the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982). In Shideler, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from
his poor mental and physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug
abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity
of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a crime. Id. at 594-95. Therefore, the Court reduced Shideler’s sentence
from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed
twelve years. Id. at 593.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Daley asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his military service, employment history, remorse, and acceptance of
responsibility, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Daley respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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